Letter to the editor

 

Does ANSTO have security measures in place to protect its nuclear facilities and materials?     

All our nuclear facilities and materials are protected in accordance with stringent  national and international physical protection obligations. These arrangements are  reviewed regularly by the Australian Safeguards and Non-proliferation Office and  other national security authorities. Very few reactors around the world would enjoy the security arrangements that HIFAR does. HIFAR is located inside its own stringent security zone within the Lucas Heights site which in turn has its own  general security arrangements. The site is surrounded by a 1.6 kilometre buffer  zone that excludes residential development. 
 

Has ANSTO strengthened its security since the September 11 terrorist attacks in the United States?     

 
Following those attacks, the responsible government security authorities issued a  general notification to all Commonwealth agencies to maintain enhanced security  awareness. ANSTO is presently maintaining increased vigilance. The HIFAR  reactor is in full operation and ANSTO continues to meet its supply commitments. 
 

What about the allegations that terrorists in New Zealand were planning to attack the HIFAR reactor?    

 

These allegations were first raised in the run-up to the Olympics last year. Responsible security authorities advised ANSTO and the press at the time that there was no substance to the allegations. That advice has been repeated in the press in recent days. It is disappointing that, despite the facts, certain groups have pretended that the year old, demonstrably false allegations, which include false statements as to what was found by New Zealand police, are true. 
 

Has ANSTO considered shutting HIFAR down at the present time?      

 
In making the decision to keep HIFAR operating at the present time, Australia is mirroring what is happening in the United States and around the world, where not only research reactors but also power reactors (which contain much more uranium fuel) continue to operate. ANSTO has also been advised of problems overseas relating to the transport of medical radioisotopes in the current circumstances. This makes the continued operation of the reactor of even greater importance for the health of all Australians. 
 

What would happen if a passenger aircraft were to be crashed into HIFAR?   

 
An analysis of the consequences of an incident involving the crash of a large aircraft into HIFAR with subsequent fire was undertaken in 1997, and reported in the environmental impact analysis prepared for the proposed second Sydney airport at Holsworthy. That analysis concluded that, even in the unlikely event that an aircraft was able to hit the relatively small target presented by HIFAR, the worst case scenario for members of the public would be similar to a medical procedure such as a bone or heart scan. 
 
If such an event occurred, the precautions recommended in ANSTO's emergency plan (which can be found on ANSTO's web site and in local libraries) would be appropriate and adequate. 
 
It is worth remembering that HIFAR is a research reactor, not a power reactor, and as such its fundamental design greatly limits any risk to public safety, as has been affirmed by the Nuclear Safety Bureau (now ARPANSA). Specifically, HIFAR: 
 
  • uses only 7 kilograms of uranium. Typical power reactors use around 150 tonnes; 
  • operates at low temperatures and under low pressure; and 
  • has numerous inherent safety devices ranging from layers of physical shielding and complex operational procedures and systems, through to extremely rapid shutdown should there be even the slightest departure from normal operation. HIFAR is surrounded by a secure building protected by a security regime and trained personnel. 
 

Has the issue of sabotage been addressed in the planning for the replacement reactor?       

 
Appropriate security and sabotage experts have been involved in assessments of the design of the replacement reactor. The issue of sabotage was in fact addressed in the Preliminary Safety Analysis Report (PSAR) for the replacement  reactor, publicly available since June this year. 
 
An international peer review team, lead by the International Atomic Energy Agency said of the PSAR that it "reflects the present design of the replacement research reactor accurately, effectively and in considerable detail. It has been prepared using IAEA safety standards and reflects good current international practice. We consider the PSAR received by ARPANSA provides an adequate basis for licensing purposes." No doubt, ARPANSA will consider the question of sabotage in deciding whether to issue a licence for the construction of the replacement reactor.  
Published: 13/02/2001

Recent articles

See all »

Media enquiry form

If you have a media enquiry please call
Phil McCall: +61 438 619 987

Or

Send »

Please provide us with your name, phone number and
email so we can get back to you.

Error: Enquiry was not sent! Check all fields have been populated correctly.
Success: Enquiry was sent successfully.